Abstract-Traffic offloading via device-to-device (D2D) communications has been proposed to alleviate the traffic burden on base stations and to improve the spectral and energy efficiency of cellular networks. The success of D2D communications relies on the willingness of users to share contents. In this paper, we study an economic aspect of traffic offloading via content sharing among multiple devices and propose an incentive framework for D2D assisted offloading. In the proposed incentive framework, the operator improves its overall profit, defined as the network economic efficiency (ECE), by encouraging users to act as D2D transmitters (D2D-Txs) which broadcast their popular contents to nearby users. We analytically characterize D2D-assisted offloading in cellular networks for two operating modes: 1) underlay mode and 2) overlay mode. We model the optimization of network ECE as a two-stage Stackelberg game, considering the densities of cellular users and D2D-Txs, the operator's incentives, and the popularity of contents. The closed-form expressions of network ECE for both underlay and overlay modes of D2D communications are obtained. Numerical results show that the achievable network ECE of the proposed incentive D2D-assisted offloading network can be significantly improved with respect to the conventional cellular networks, where the D2D communications are disabled.
on base stations (BSs) by exploiting physical proximity of devices [5] . There are two operating modes of D2D communications: underlay (sharing spectrum with cellular links) and overlay (orthogonal spectrum to cellular networks) [6] . In the underlay mode, the mutual interference between cellular tier and D2D tier should be considered. In the overlay mode, the cross-tier interference is eliminated at the price of reduced cellular bandwidth within the limited licensed spectrum. Existing works on D2D communications have studied resource and power allocation [7] , mode selection [8] , spectral and energy efficiency [9] , [10] . From the operator's perspective, it is of more interest to consider economic benefits from operation, such as cost for operating, and so on, which serves our unique holistic view on D2D communications.
In the meantime, content sharing among multiple devices, e.g., video streaming, has been regarded as one of the most promising methods for traffic offloading and as the tremendous data consuming application in wireless communications [11] , [12] . When a content requester downloads a popular file, a nearby device can deliver it locally, e.g., through the synchronous content transmission application [13] . In [14] , the authors designed a social-aware video multiCast (SoCast) system based on D2D communications by considering the social trust and social reciprocity. Actually, the success of D2D assisted offloading relies on the willingness of users to share contents, given the power consumption for transmission. Thus, network operators can offer incentives to encourage users to participate in D2D content sharing [15] , [16] . However, both [15] and [16] considered a single cell and the impacts of wireless channels and interference are not taken into account.
On the other hand, the operator's profit has been studied for wireless networks [2] [3] [4] , [17] , but not for D2D communications. In [3] , the economic benefits of delayed WiFi offloading were investigated, while in [4] the economic effects of useroriented delayed Wi-Fi offloading were studied in monopoly and duopoly market models. In [17] , pricing strategies for both macro and femto cell operators in a cognitive femtocell network were discussed. However, none of these works have considered the operator's profit with respect to D2D assisted offloading especially from system-level perspective. The interrelation between pricing incentives and transmit powers at both BS and D2D transmitters (D2D-Txs) (and thus the co-channel interference) is not well understood yet.
In this paper, we define the operator's profit as the economic efficiency (ECE) [18] , which is the difference between the operating income from users and the total operating cost. The total operating cost consists of power cost at BSs and 1536-1276 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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incentive cost for D2D-Txs. We analyze the network ECE on the downlink cellular networks with D2D traffic offloading, where the D2D-Txs are motivated by operator to broadcast the popular contents to its nearby users. We consider that D2D-Txs are rational and can control their transmit power to maximize their utilities, and the operator determines both the incentives to potential D2D-Txs and the subsequent radio resource management in order to maximize its overall profit. Compared with [19] focusing on the underlay mode of D2D offloading, we consider both underlay (partial frequency reuse) and overlay modes of D2D communications and provide a generalized economic analytical framework. We jointly optimize both incentives and radio resources of D2D communications for the two D2D operating modes and compare their performance from an economic perspective. We also remove the constraint of non-overlapping offloading regions used in [19] and consider potentially different content popularities.
The main contributions of this work are summarized below: 1) Tractable Model for D2D Assisted Offloading: We develop a novel and tractable analytical model for accurately capturing the traffic offloading from cellular links to D2D links. In particular, the density of cellular users, which do not participate in D2D content sharing, is specified by incorporating the popularity of the shared contents and the offloading region of D2D-Txs. We also characterize the transmit power at both the D2D-Tx and the BS, under the constraint of users' average data rate requirement, which represents users' quality of service (QoS). This model is flexible enough to apply to both underlay and overlay modes of D2D communications.
2) System-Level Economic Analysis: We derive the closedform expressions for the network ECE in both underlay and overlay modes of D2D assisted offloading. We obtain the optimal offloading radius of a D2D-Tx based on a two-stage Stackelberg game. This enables us to quantify the number of offloaded users, which ultimately leads to the optimized transmit power of BS and the network ECE. The maximum network ECE is called achievable network ECE in this paper, and we obtain the optimal density of D2D-Txs that maximizes the achievable network ECE. In addition, the network ECE is analyzed when the D2D assisted offloading is disabled and the optimal price offered to cellular users is obtained.
3) Network Design Insights: Our analysis leads to several system design guidelines. First, compared with the conventional cellular networks, sharing popular contents through the incentive D2D communications can significantly improve the network ECE. The optimal solutions for both incentives and radio resource management can be obtained based on our model numerically. Second, it is unprofitable to use the overlay mode of D2D communications when the shared content is not very popular. Finally, the overlay mode achieves a higher network ECE when the D2D-Txs density is small, but when the D2D-Txs density is large, the underlay mode achieves a higher network ECE.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and the utility functions of the operator and D2D-Tx. Section III and IV formulates the mathematical economic model of D2D assisted cellular networks for underlay and overlay mode, respectively. Section V studies the operator's economy when D2D assisted offloading is disabled. Numerical results are shown and discussed in section VI. The conclusions are summarized in section VII.
Notation: E [x] denotes the expectation of variable x. P [ A] denotes the probability that event A happens. y * denotes the optimal value of y. Finally, [x] + = max {0, x}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Network layout
We consider the cellular downlink collocated with D2D communications as in Fig. 1 . We assume that BSs are distributed following a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) on the entire plane R 2 with the density of λ B BSs/m 2 , and that they can be denoted as the set of B = b j , j = 0, 1, 2, ... . Each BS has the maximum allowable transmit power P m . D2D-Txs are uniformly distributed on R 2 according to another independent PPP with the density of λ D D2D-Txs/m 2 , and the set of D2D-Txs is denoted by D . Each D2D-Tx has the maximum allowable transmit power P D . Users are spatially scattered on R 2 following another independent PPP, denoted by the set U with the density λ u users/m 2 . Users are classified into cellular users (served by BSs) and offloaded users (using D2D links).
B. User's Association and Content Popularity
Each cellular user connects to its closest BS b j ∈ B , and the cell area of BS b j can be defined as the set In D2D communications, the i th offloaded user u d i,k connects to the k th D2D-Tx u DT k if the following two requirements are both satisfied; otherwise, the user connects to the closest BS. First, the distance between user 
which forms a circular region centered at u DT k with the radius of R D , where the offloaded user's QoS can be guaranteed. We use the average required data rate of users as the user's QoS requirement.
The probability that the requested content of a typical cellular user u 0 is available at an arbitrary D2D-Tx is defined as content popularity. We assume that D2D-Txs are partitioned into Z disjoint groups according to the popularity of their available contents. The set of group index is Z = {1, 2, ..., Z }, and group z is denoted by G z . The ratio of the size of group G z to the total number of D2D-Txs is denoted by ϕ z (z ∈ Z). We define P G z con 0 P G z con 1, z ∈ Z as the probability that a user's requested content is available in group G z , which also indicates the content popularity of group G z . The popularity of these content chunks is expressed by a vector P con = P
con . It's worth noting that, in each group, although the D2D-Txs may have different content chunks, the popularity of these contents are nearly the same and we take their average as P G z con in group G z . The value of content popularity can be obtained by the keywords feature extraction method [20] , [21] or the machine learning method [22] , [23] according to the users' download history.
C. Radio Resources
The total bandwidth of the operator is B MHz. The bandwidth of the cellular downlink is denoted by B C MHz, and the bandwidth for D2D communications is B D MHz. To maintain generality, in the underlay mode, B C = B, and B D = ρ B where ρ represents the frequency reuse factor. In the overlay mode, the bandwidth of cellular system is B C = (1 − ω) B where ω is the frequency partition factor, and B D = ωB. We consider full frequency reuse in cellular networks.
D. Cellular Downlink
Cellular users in cell V j can be denoted as a set of c u, j , where There is no intra-cell interference due to the orthogonal multiple access in a cell.
We assume that each BS is capable of performing adaptive power control according to user feedback channel state information (CSI) [24] . According to Shannon's theorem, in the underlay mode, BS b j allocates the transmit power P B i, j for user u c i, j to achieve the required data rate R 
F. Economic Utility Functions
Assumptions. we make several assumptions for mathematically tractable analysis of the network ECE.
First, we assume that all the cellular users have an identical data rate requirement of R u , i.e., R
This assumption is made for mathematical tractability, but more importantly because we mainly focus on the system-level performance of multi-cell networks and on providing network design insights statistically. We can consider R u as the average required data rate of users in the networks. For example, R u can be calculated by 
This assumption is reasonable, because the offloading procedure is transparent to users. Although a user is offloaded from cellular link onto D2D link, s/he would not be aware of the type of transmission, and thus the data rate requirement of the user will not change instantly during the offloading process.
Inspired by [18] and [25] , economic efficiency measures the profitability of the network operator (in monetary unit per second), and the power consumption contributes to the cost of networks because the operator needs to pay the resulting electricity bills. For notational simplicity, we define the utility function of cellular operator U Operator (ε, δ) as the difference between the operating income and the total cost, as follows: (3) and T otal Cost = Power Cost + I ncenti ve Cost (4) where ε pence/Mbit/m 2 /D2D-Tx is defined as the incentive per Mbit offloaded per unit D2D-Tx offloading region, and δ is an indicator, where δ = ρ in the underlay mode and δ = ω in the overlay mode. Note that the first term on the right handside in (3) represents the operator's income per unitary area which is charged from users, and the second term includes power cost at BSs and incentive cost for implementing D2D assisted offloading.
More specifically, we have
where τ (pence/Mbit/user) in (5) (7) is the offloading area for a D2D-Tx, which captures the impact of geographic traffic volume in a large-scale networks. In addition, the content distribution of each user and the content popularity are essential for the operator to design an efficient incentive offloading scheme. Motivated by [22] , the baseband units (BBUs) can predict the distribution of content request and users's mobility. This information gathering phase results in the additional computational cost for the operator, which can be approximately regarded as a fix cost. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the content distribution and the content popularity are known by the operator and that the associated computational cost is constant and can be ignored in the operator's utility function (4) . Accordingly, the utility of D2D-Tx U D2D−T x (R D ) (pence/s/D2D-Tx) is defined as the difference between its incentive income and power cost as follows
where ε is the operator's incentive parameter as previously defined in (3), c D (pence/Joule/D2D-Tx) denotes the cost factor of the power consumption at a D2D-Tx, and
is the D2D-Tx's expected minimum transmit power.
G. Implementation of Incentive D2D Assisted Offloading
The overall process of the proposed incentive D2D assisted offloading is given in the following steps.
Step 1: When a user requests a content, the operator will first check if any D2D-Txs in the proximity of the user within distance R D are broadcasting the requested content.
Step 2: If yes, the operator allows the user to receive files from one of these D2D-Txs via D2D communications. If not, the operator will search in the surrounding area with radius R D of the user for potential D2D-Txs having the requested content.
Step 3: If potential D2D-Txs are found, the operator will select one of them to transmit the requested content to the user via a D2D link, and give an incentive to the selected D2D-Tx. Otherwise, the serving BS will transmit the requested content to the user via the cellular downlink.
Step 4: If the offloaded content-requesting user strolls out of the offloading region of its previous associated D2D-Tx, which suggests that the user's data rate requirement will not be guaranteed and will be less than its previous cellular data rate, the operator will reselect a D2D-Tx for the user following the process from Step 1 to Step 3.
In the incentive mechanism of Step 3, the operator acts as the leader to announce the incentive of traffic offloading and the allocation of D2D radio resources. Then, based on the given incentive and radio resources, the D2D-Tx (as a follower) decides its offloading radius to maximize its utility. Accordingly, we formulate the incentive problem as a twostage sequential game, i.e., a Stackelberg game, as follows. 
ε, δ) in (3). The utility function of D2D-Tx is given by U D2D−T x (R D ) in (8).
Strategies: The operator optimizes the incentive parameter ε and the bandwidth δ of D2D radio resources (where δ = ρ in the underlay mode, and δ = ω in the overlay mode). D2D-Tx optimizes the offloading radius R D .
III. SYSTEM-LEVEL ECE WITH UNDERLAY MODE OF D2D COMMUNICATIONS
In this section, we analyze the Stackelberg game using backward induction. We first derive the expected minimum transmit power of D2D-Tx as a function of the D2D offloading radius. Based on the expected minimum transmit power and the utility function of D2D-Tx, we obtain the reaction function of the follower D2D-Tx in stage II. Then, we derive the average aggregated transmit power at a BS, and solve the leader's profit-maximization problem in stage I according to its utility function.
A. Stage II: Follower's Game -D2D-Tx's Offloading Radius
In stage II, each D2D-Tx determines its offloading radius under the QoS requirement of users. Then the transmit power of D2D-Tx can be determined. 
where (x) = +∞ 0 t x−1 e −t dt is the standard gamma function, and the path-loss exponent α > 2 [26] .
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A for the proof. Note that although α < 4 would be required for a positive value of the mean interference power in the square bracket of (9), our numerical results show that the mean interference power converges to a value very close to zero for α 4. Thus, we approximate the mean interference power to zero for α 4.
Assuming identical data rate requirements of users, i.e., R
Although the user's data rate requirement fluctuates over time and the data rate requirements of users may be various, this equality constraint statistically represents the average minimum transmit power of a D2D-Tx, which can simplify the analysis of the network ECE.
According to (10) , the optimal offloading radius of a D2D-Tx, which maximizes the D2D-Tx's utility (8) 
Proof: The optimal offloading radius R * D of D2D-Tx can be obtained by plugging (10) into (8) and maximizing its utility function (8) . We obtain the first order derivative of
Assuming 2 < α < 4, we have lim
According to (13), we have lim
obtained by solving the equation
, the unique optimal offloading radius R * D of D2D-Tx is obtained in (11) . In Corollary 1, the optimal offloading radius R * D increases with the incentive ε, while decreases with the cost factor of power consumption c D and the density of D2D-Txs λ D . Since denser D2D-Txs could cause severe interference to each other, the transmit power at D2D-Tx should be increased in order to guarantee the QoS of offloaded users.
It's worth noting that (11) is the expected optimal offloading radius of a D2D-Tx, where parameters such as the users' average data rate requirement R u are assumed to be known by the D2D-Tx. Therefore, the operator should inform the D2D-Tx of the users' QoS requirements, so that the D2D-Tx can allocate sufficient power for transmission. Other network parameters like the system bandwidth and the path-loss exponent are assumed to be known to the D2D-Txs as the priori information from network.
In addition, substituting (11) into (10) gives the optimal transmit power at D2D-Tx denoted by E P D,opt k .
Proposition 2: The optimal transmit power at a typical D2D-Tx u DT k is given by
Proof: Substituting (11) into (10) gives us the desired result.
Subsequently, by substituting (11) into (10) in place of R D and then substituting (10) into (8), we obtain the D2D-Tx's maximum utility given in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2: Consider the D2D assisted offloading underlaid with cellular networks, where the incentive ε and the average required data rate R u of users are given, the maximum utility of D2D-Tx is given by
where R * D is given in Corollary 1.
, the maximum utility of D2D-Tx is given by
With some manipulation, (16) can be simplified into (15) . It can be observed that U * D2D−T x increases with the incentive ε, and D2D-Tx does not get any benefit when there is no incentive, i.e., ε = 0.
B. Stage I: Leader's Game -Maximization of Network ECE
In stage I, based on the D2D-Tx's optimal offloading radius R * D , the operator maximizes the network ECE by optimizing the incentive ε and frequency reuse factor ρ in the underlay mode. We first specify the density λ c u of cellular users (i.e., users cannot be offloaded onto D2D links) in the D2D assisted offloading networks. 
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B for the proof. For analytical tractability, in the following Lemma, we consider the single content popularity, which can be evaluated by the weighted average of P con , and derive a simplified form of the density of cellular users. 
Proof: The proof is similar to that for Lemma 1, and thus we omit it due to the limited space.
Note that when the cellular users are offloaded onto D2D links, some BSs have no file request and thus certain BSs can be put to sleep mode. Such fast deactivation of components is an important solution to save energy. Therefore, based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can obtain the active probability of BSs as follows [27] 
where K = 3.575 [27] . It's worth noting that increasing the content popularity, such as P G z con for each group G z in Lemma 1 and P con in Lemma 2, results in the decrease of cellular users' density λ c u , which reduces the active probability P act of BSs. Therefore, many BSs can be put to sleep mode in the dense network with higher-value of content popularity. This BSs' active probability also influences the number of interfering BSs when we evaluate the total received interference power from BSs. Specifically, the density of interfering BSs is P act λ B , since the independent thinning of a PPP is still PPP [26] .
Next, the expected minimum transmit power E P B i, j at BS b j for user u c i, j is obtained in the following Proposition. 
where E P D,opt k denotes the optimal transmit power at D2D-Tx, which is obtained in Proposition 2.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C for the proof.
We can obtain the average aggregated transmit power E P B j at a BS b j as follows
Therefore, the utility of the operator is expressed by
Note that more advanced scheduling techniques can help the operator further improve its profit. The above definition and analysis can be combined with various scheduling models, although specific scheduling algorithms may reduce the mathematical tractability in performance analysis. Since the design or the impact of a specific scheduling scheme is not the focus of this paper and for analytical tractability, we consider the classic round-robin scheduling at BSs (i.e., ∀μ c i, j = 1). Then, we quantify the average aggregated transmit power at a BS as a function of incentive ε, frequency reuse factor ρ and other network parameters.
Proposition 4: In the underlay mode of D2D communications, given the users' average required data rate R u , the BSs density λ B and the D2D-Txs density λ D , the average aggregated transmit power at BS b j is given by
where λ c u is given in Lemma 1 and/or Lemma 2, the variable ζ u = 2 Proof: By some algebraic manipulation, we can prove ∂E P B j ∂β > 0, which is omitted due to the limited space. We are now in the position of completing the system-level network ECE metric for cellular networks underlaid with D2D assisted offloading. Based on Proposition 4 and the operator's utility function (3), it is straightforward to obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 5: In a cellular network underlaid with D2D assisted offloading, given the operator's incentive ε and the frequency reuse factor ρ, the closed-form expression of systemlevel network ECE is given by (25) , shown on the bottom of the next page, where is given in (14) and ζ u is defined in (23) .
The operator's profit-maximization problem is given by
where the constraint C 1 guarantees that the transmit power of BS would not exceed its maximum allowable transmit power P m , where E P B i, j is given in (20) and R * D is given in (11). The constraint C 2 insures that the transmit power of each D2D-Tx will not exceed the maximum allowable transmit power P D , where E P D,opt k is given in (14) . It's worth noting that the cost factor c D of power consumption at D2D-Txs is the required information for the operator in this optimization process. The cost factor c D can be obtained by market statistics and surveys [28] , while other network parameters can be captured by the operator straightforwardly, such as the density of network nodes, the system bandwidth and the path-loss exponent.
The equilibrium of the two-stage Stackelberg game is denoted by (ε * , ρ * ) = arg max
Operator (ε, ρ) under the constraints of C 1 and C 2 in (24) . The existence of the equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of a unique optimal offloading radius R * D , which maximizes D2D-Tx's utility for given ε and ρ, and an optimal (ε * , ρ * ), which maximizes the operator's profit. The unique R * D is given in the proof of Corollary 1. In addition, a sufficient condition for the existence of the optimal (ε * , ρ * ) is that there exists a ε which maximizes the operator's profit for given ρ. Due to the limited space, the proof of the above sufficient condition is omitted. In fact, in the D2D underlay mode, the network ECE first rises with ε and then declines for given ρ. Due to the closedform expression of the network ECE in (25) , as shown at the bottom of this page, the optimal (ε * , ρ * ) can be obtained by exhaustive searching or the optimization algorithms.
IV. SYSTEM-LEVEL ECE WITH OVERLAY MODE OF D2D COMMUNICATIONS
Different from the underlay mode of D2D communications, the radio resources of cellular and D2D links are orthogonal in the overlay mode.
We model the incentive interactions between the operator and the D2D-Tx in the overlay mode based on a two-stage sequential game (e.g. Stackelberg game). In stage I, the operator (as a leader) decides the incentive ε and the D2D frequency partition factor ω, while in stage II, each D2D-Tx determines the offloading radius as a follower.
A. Stage II: Followers' Game -D2D-Tx's Offloading Radius
In stage II, a D2D-Tx determines the optimal offloading radius R * D to maximize its utility. First, we have the following Proposition which characterizes D2D-Tx's expected minimum transmit power in the overlay mode. 
Proof: Note that, in the overlay mode, the available bandwidth for a typical D2D link is 
and the PDF of z d−d
i,k is given in (48). Therefore, the expected minimum transmit power of u DT k is obtained as follows
Substituting (48) into (28), we have the desired result in Proposition 6.
The optimal offloading radius R * D of D2D-Tx in the overlay mode is obtained in the sequel.
Corollary 3: Consider the D2D assisted offloading overlaid with cellular network, where the densities of BSs and D2D-Txs are λ B and λ D , respectively. Given the incentive ε, frequency partition factor ω and the average required service data rate R u of users, the closed-form optimal offloading radius of a
(29)
Proof: The proof is similar to that for Corollary 1, and thus the detailed proof is omitted due to limited space.
In addition, by substituting (29) into (26), we obtain the optimal transmit power of a D2D-Tx in the overlay mode.
Proposition 7: The optimal transmit power at a typical D2D-Tx u DT k in the overlay mode is given by
B. Stage I: Leader's Game -Maximization of Network ECE
In the overlay mode, the operator maximizes its utility by jointly optimizing the incentive ε and the frequency partition factor ω. It's worth noting that, in both underlay and overlay modes, the density of cellular users remains the same, which is given in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 for multiple and single content popularity, respectively.
The average aggregated transmit power at a BS as a function of incentive ε, frequency partition factor ω and other network parameters is derived in the following.
Proposition 8: In the overlay mode of D2D communications, given the users' average required data rate R u , the BSs density λ B and the D2D-Txs density λ D , the average aggregated transmit power at BS b j is given by
Proof: In the overlay mode, the available bandwidth for cellular system is (1 − ω) is given in (60), which completes the proof. Proposition 9: In a cellular network overlaid with D2D assisted offloading, given the operator's incentive ε and the frequency partition factor ω, the closed-form expression of system-level network ECE is given by (31) at the bottom of this page, where is defined in (30) In the overlay mode, the operator can maximize the network ECE by jointly optimizing ε and ω. The operator's profitmaximization problem is formulated as follows
where the constraint C 1 guarantees that the transmit power of BS would not exceed its maximum allowable transmit power P m , and E P B i, j is given in (34) . Intuitively, if ω is selected at a higher-value, which results in less radio resources for cellular users, the transmit power at a BS should be increased to satisfy the users' required data rate in compensation for the reduction of the cellular bandwidth. The constraint C 2 indicates the upper bound of the transmit power at D2D-Tx, where E P D,opt k is given in (30) and R * D is given in (29) .
V. OPERATOR'S PROFIT WITHOUT D2D OFFLOADING
In this section, we analyze the network operator's profit when D2D assisted offloading is disabled. Given the BSs density λ B , users density λ u and the users' average data rate requirement R u , the operator can maximize its profit by optimizing the price τ . More specifically, we firstly predict the average R u , and then determine the optimal τ so as to maximize the operator's profit.
A. Prediction of User's Traffic Demand
We formulate the user's utility U U ser by considering the following two characteristics: (a) logarithmically increasing with data rate [29] , and (b) linearly decreasing with cost under usage-based pricing [30] . Thus, the user's utility is given by
where θ (no units) is defined as a user's willingnessto-pay, assumed to be uniformly distributed from 0 to θ max , ξ u (pence/Mbits/user) represents the income factor that reflects the relationship between the data rate requirement and the monetary value, and τ (pence/Mbits/user) is the operator's income per Mbits for each user as defined in Section II-F. A higher value of ξ u indicates that users prefer to purchase more traffic data. Such utility represented by logarithmic function is widely used in economic literatures to reflect the diminishing returns of getting more resources [31] .
Since U U ser is a concave function of R u , the optimal average data rate requirement (traffic demand) per user (R * u ) can be obtained by applying the first order necessary condition and taking average over θ , which is given in the following:
We can observe that R * u increases with the factor θ max of willingness-to-pay and the income factor ξ u of user, while it decreases with the traffic usage price τ , which is in line with the intuition.
B. Optimal Price Determination
Note that in the D2D assisted offloading cellular network, the optimized price τ = τ * is given before the optimization problem of (24) and (35) . The utility function of the operator without D2D assisted offloading is given by
where E P B j R * u can be obtained from Proposition 8 by substituting R * u for R u , λ u for λ c u , and setting ω = 0 in (32), P non B denotes the non-transmission power at a BS. Proof: Please refer to Appendix E for the proof. The problem of finding the optimal price for a cellular network is formulated as follows: (25) with the underlay mode of D2D communications, where P con = 0.5.
where E P B i, j R c i, j =R * u P m is the expected minimum transmit power conditioned on the user's optimal traffic demand R * u , and P m is the maximum allowable transmit power of BS.
In the next section, we provide numerical examples to understand the impact of system parameters on the network ECE.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, numerical results are provided to characterize the network ECE with and without D2D assisted offloading. Motivated by [18] and [28] , the system parameters are summarized in Table IV , unless otherwise stated.
In Fig. 2 , the network ECE gain in the underlay mode of D2D communications is shown, which is defined by
where U
U nderlay
Operator (ε, ρ) and U
No−D2D
Operator are given in (25) and (38), respectively. In simulations, the optimal price τ * for cellular users is obtained by (40), and the optimal average rate R * u is given by (37). We observe that when the operator's incentive ε is very small, the network ECE gain approaches zero, since few D2D-Txs are willing to offload traffic. In addition, the achievable ECE gain is obtained at the case of full frequency reuse with an appropriate incentive. Fig. 3 shows the network ECE gain in the overlay mode of D2D communications, which is defined as
It can be observed that the operator can maximize its profit by selecting appropriate values for the incentive ε and the frequency partition factor ω. It's worth noting that, in the optimization problem (35) , increasing operator's incentive ε results in the larger offloading radius R * D at D2D-Tx according to (29) , at the same time the transmit power of D2D-Tx (26) should not exceed its maximum allowable transmit power P D . Therefore, when D2D-Txs transmit at P D , increasing ε will lead to the decrease of network ECE.
In Fig. 4 , we also compare the network ECE with different frequency partition factor ω for the overlay mode of D2D assisted offloading. Considering the baseline profit when D2D communications are disabled, we observe that it is unprofitable to utilize the overlay mode of D2D assisted offloading when the shared contents are not very popular, such as the lines with P con = 0.05 and P con = 0.08 in Fig. 4 . This is because that smaller value of content popularity results in less users to be offloaded onto D2D links according to Lemma 2, and thus the reduction of power cost at BSs will not be able to compensate for the operator's incentive expenditure. In Fig. 5 , we compare the achievable network ECE gain as a function of the D2D-Txs density in both underlay and overlay modes of D2D communications, where in the underlay mode, the achievable ECE gain is defined as
We can see that the proposed incentive offloading design is significantly superior to the baseline design of conventional cellular networks in terms of the achievable network ECE gain. Besides, there exists an optimal D2D-Txs density which can maximize the achievable network ECE gain. These results indicate that when the number of D2D-Txs is large, most traffic would have been offloaded onto D2D communications and the operator pays an incentive to each D2D-Tx. As a result, the increase of incentive cost dominates the decrease of power cost. Fig. 5 also shows that the overlay mode outperforms the underlay mode in terms of the achievable network ECE gain when the density of D2D-Txs is small. This is because that the overlay mode can effectively benefit from the elimination of cross-tier interference for an appropriate D2D-Tx density. However, when the density of D2D-Txs is large, the cochannel interference becomes severe, and thus the benefit of cross-tier interference elimination becomes negligible. Furthermore, in the overlay mode, the transmit power at BS would be increased in compensation for the reduction of bandwidth compared with the underlay mode. We observe that the achievable network ECE gain declines quickly in Comparison of the achievable network ECE gain for both the underlay and the overlay modes of D2D communications with different content popularity P con .
the overlay mode when the density of D2D-Txs becomes large.
We also compare the achievable network ECE gain with different values of content popularity. The numerical results in Fig. 6 show that the achievable network ECE gain increases with the content popularity P con , since the probability that a user can be offloaded onto D2D link increases with P con , and the advantages of D2D communications can be fully utilized. When the content popularity is small (e.g., P con < 0.09), the underlay mode outperforms the overlay mode of D2D communications. This is consistent with the results in Fig. 4 , where few users will be offloaded onto D2D links when the contents are not very popular, and thus the reduction of power cost at BSs will not be able to compensate for the operator's incentive expenditure.
In Fig. 7 , the achievable network ECE gain decreases with the frequency division parameter β in the underlay mode. Based on Remark 1 in Section III-B, when β rises, we conclude that the increase of the operator's power cost dominates the reduction of its incentive cost in the utility function (4) . In addition, regardless of the value of content popularity, the achievable network ECE gain decreases with β.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed an incentive framework for modeling and analyzing the D2D assisted offloading networks, where the operator determines both the incentives to potential D2D-Tx's and the subsequent radio resource management in order to maximize the network economic efficiency (ECE). By modeling the incentive traffic offloading as a two-stage Stackelberg game, we have analyzed the network ECE in both underlay and overlay modes of D2D communications. We have derived closed-form expressions of the network ECE for these two modes and compared them with the baseline case where D2D assisted offloading is disabled. The numerical and simulation results demonstrated that the network ECE can be significantly improved by incentive stimulating of D2D based content sharing. Moreover, we have provided system design guidelines on D2D mode selection, considering the effects of content popularity and D2D-Txs density on the achievable network ECE gain. Specifically, the overlay mode outperforms the underlay mode in terms of the network ECE gain when the density of D2D-Txs is small. However, when the density of D2D-Txs is large or the content popularity is relatively small, the underlay mode achieves a higher network ECE gain than the overlay mode.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 Recall that, in the underlay mode, the required data rate for an offloaded user u d i,k is expressed in (2), as follows
Based on the mathematical transformation of (44), the required transmit power for a typical D2D-Tx u DT k is given by = 1, which characterizes the average performance in the channel [32] .
Based on the Campbell's Theorem of PPP [26] , [33] , the total received interference power I C d,i,k generated from cellular links is given by
where, in ( Similarly, the total received interference power I D d,i,k generated from D2D communications is given by
where [26] , [33] 
In addition, although the cell's boundary forms a Voronoi tessellation, it can be accurately evaluated by a circle area with the radius of R B = 1 √ πλ B [34] . Therefore, the PDF of y
is given by
In order to guarantee the users' QoS on the boundary of the offloading region, we consider d = R D into (45), and thus the required transmit power of D2D-Tx u DT k is obtained as
Then we have the desired result in Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Recall that a user can be offloaded onto a D2D link only if the two aforementioned requirements in section II-B are satisfied. For a typical user u 0 , denote r 0 as the distance between u 0 and its nearest D2D-Tx in group G z , and the PDF of r 0 is [26] 
Then we have the probability P O L,z that the distance r 0 is less than R * D , i.e., the probability that u 0 is located in at least one of the offloading regions of D2D-Txs in group G z , as follows:
We consider the case that there are m (m 1) D2D-Txs in group G z in a circular region with the radius of R * D centered for u 0 . Then the density of cellular users (i.e., users cannot be offloaded onto D2D communications) λ c u is given by
where cellular users are distributed following a PPP with the density of λ c u . We assume that the D2D-Txs in group G z are distributed according to Poisson distributions. The Probability Mass Func-
Therefore, 
Substituting (55) and (52) into (53) gives us the desired result in Lemma 1.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
According to (1), the expected minimum transmit power of BS b j for user u 
Note that E P D,opt k is the optimal transmit power at D2D-Tx, which is obtained in (14) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The aggregated transmit power of BS b j can be derived
E P B i, j . Since we suppose that cellular users follow Poisson distribution, the PMF of N c j is [35] 
where E P D,opt k is given in (14) and ζ u = 2 Since U 2 (x) is a concave and non-increasing function, and (τ ) is a convex function, therefore, U 2 ( (τ )) is a concave function of τ [36] . In addition, since 
